



THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONCLUDING EXEMPTION
CLAUSE IN THE BANKRUPT LAW.
Tha fourteenth section of the national Bankrupt Law of 1867,
after designating the manner in which the title to the bankrupt's
property shall be transferred to and vested in his assignee, pro-
ceeds to except a number of specified articles from the operation
of the assignment, and then makes a further and concluding ex-
emption. in favor of "such other property not included in the
foregoing exceptions, as is exempted from levy and sale upon,
execution or other process or order of court, by the laws of the
state in which the bankrupt had- his'domicil at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount
not exceeding that allowed by such state exemption laws in force
in the year 1864."
This last exemption clause, it will be observed, is a new feature
in our bankruptcy legislation. Neither the Act of 1800 nor that
of 1841 contains anything similar to it, although the latter act
was passed mainly in the interest of the debtor class. It is pro,
posed in this article to inquire whether this provision in the law-
is or is not constitutional and valid.
The Constitution of the United States,, Article I., Sec. YII.,
declares that "The Congress shall have power ....... .To
establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and. uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United: States."
"OL. XV.-46 (721)
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This grant of power stands upon much the same foundation
with that of regulating commerce, given in the preceding clause
of the same section. It is the interest of every state to show
especial favor to the commercial enterprises of its own citizens,
and it is a common policy to protect their trade from competition
by discriminating regulations, and in case of loss to shield them,
as far as honesty will permit, from being stripped of their remain-
ing property by foreign creditors. The mischiefs, then, to be
guarded against by this 'coustitutional provision were that the
several states might give different measures of justice to creditors
from different jurisdictions, and that a dishonest debtor, also, by
scattering his property about in several. states, might keep a part
out of the reach of the law: Federalist, XLIL Hence would
result not only inequality of rights to creditors, but also, from
multiplicity of legislation, a general ignorance of what those rights
might be in each particular case where credit was given to a citi-
zen of another state, while debtors, on the other hand, would find
opened a wide door to fraud and evasion. Another reason for a
national systeim, entitled to regard, was to be found in the prefer-
ence given by our American courts to attaching domestic credit-
ors over foreign assignees in insolvency.
As bankruptcy legislation, at .the time when our Constitution
was framed and for many years afterward, was considered wholly
in the interest of the creditor class, it is-probable that little weight
was given to the .other possible result of this grant of power, that
of giving an honest debtor the opportunity bf commencing life
anew, free. from the fetters of all previous obligations, wherever
he might try his fortunes.
The remedy for these mischiefs-the legislation to meet these"
wants-the Constitution, then, put it in the power of Congress to
supply; but this grant is coupled with a limitation: the laws estab-
lished must be uniform throughout the United States. This con-
dition is bound up with the power.
What is the meaning of uniform laws? In Worcester's Dic-
tionary the definition given of the word uniform is: "Having
always the same form, fashion, or manner; following the same
plan, rnetho'd; design, or tenor; consistent, consonant, .....
undeviating,'equable, alike ;" and one of the illustrative quota-
tions annexed is this from Bishop Taylor: "Sometimes there are
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many parts of a law, and sometimes it is uniform and hath in it
but one duty." In the history of English law the term is familiar.
In 1548 was enacted the statute 2 Edward VI., a Bill for an
Uniformity of Service and Administration of Sacraments to be
had throughout the Realm. The preamble sets forth " That there
had been several forms of service, and that of late there had
been great difference in the administration of the sacraments
....... But, that there might be an uniform way over all
the kingdom, the king ..... had appointed the Archbishop
of Canterbury, with other learned and discreet bishops and
divines, to draw up an order of divine worship ..... .which
they, by the aid of the Holy Ghost, had with one uniform agree-
ment concluded on:" Parliam. Hist. Vol. 8, p. 284. An act
of similar character was the famous "Act of Uniformity," 13 &
14 Car. II., which required every clergyman to assent to the
same form of worship and doctrine, as established by law through-
out the kingdom. In our own Constitution the term occurs but
three times, and only in this first Article -twice in the clause
immediately under consideration, and once in ,a preceding clause,
"but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States:" Hickey's Const. Analysis, p. 121. The
original draft of the latter provision read, "all duties, imposts,
and excises, prohibitions and restraints, laid or made by the
legislature of the United States, shall be uniform and equal
throughout the United States :" Elliot's Debates, Vol. 5, p. 479.
The committee to which it was referred reported it back in these
words: "All tonnage duties, imposts, and excises, laid by the
legislature, shall be uniform throughout the United States," and
it was subsequently still farther shortened and put in its present
shape: Id. pp. 484, 543. The first draft was evidently regarded.
by the committee and the Convention as redundant: laid and
made were regarded as equivalent terms, and uniform and equal
lay under the same objection.
The fourth of the Articles of Confederation- declared that the
free inhabitants of each state, with certain exceptions, should be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states, and. the provision for an uniform rule of naturali-
zation was intended to meet the difficulties resulting from this
previous- policy: Federalist, XLII.; 1 Curtis Comm. on the
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Const., p. I99.- The old law, that is, adopted the various con.
ditions of citizenship in the several states of the confederacy, and
made the citizen of one a citizen of all: the new law looked to the
establishment by the nation of' some independent and universal,
rule of admission to the privileges of its citizenship.
It would seem, then, whether we reason from etymology, from
historical use, or contemporaneous construction, that uwixoitu
LAWS can mean nothing less than laws of one and the same form,
prescribing one invriablk and universal rule.
One law or system- of laws of supreme and universal authority,
prescribing with certainty the rights of creditors in every state,
and making those rights equal-as against debtors in -every state,
and their property wherever "situated,.answers the ends proposed
by this constitutional grant; and if it also makes the bankrupt's
dischargA of equal authority in every state, and permits proof of
'claims to be made and.allowed in each state for use in any other,
the advantages of uniformity are carried -still farther. The rule
of uniformity is-The same law for all.
Such has been the legislative construction regarding the other
subjects upon which uniformity was required. One rule of natu-
ralization has been prescribed. One rate for duties, imposts, and
excises has been fixed. Suppose now that Congress should pass
a law adopting for bankruptcy proceedings in the courts of the
United States the provisions, muta8 mutandi8, of the bankrupt
or insolvent laws of the state in, which subh courts might be
held, and declaring that a discharge obtained in this manner
according to the laws of any state should be a valid discharge
throughout the United States. This would-be one law, andwould
prescribe one rule of proceeding, but it would not be one rule for
all :-it would not be, in other words, the same rule for-each case,
nor, therefore, an uniform law. Its measure of justice would be
uncertain, ificonstant, and unequal.
What has Congress done in enacting the provision now in
question ? It has allowed the laws of each state.to shield from
creditors the -property of its bankrupt citizens, to whatever
amount its legislature has seen fit to determine. True, it does
not allow these legislatures to frame new exemptions in view of
-this act, but this very provision adopting those exemptions, only,
allowed in, 1864,'-produces a still greater inequality of righti.
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In twelve states, -and among them are Pennsylvania and other
great commercial states, the laws in -force in 1864 allowed to
debtors no greater exemptions than those provided for in any
event by the universal exceptions enumerated in the national law:
James, Bankrupt Law, p. 58. Had these states the power, they
would not be unlikely, in view of this new act, to provide more
liberal exemptions for their debtor citizens, and thus put them on
a footing not less favorable than that enjoyed by debtors in other
states, whose legislation has been less in favor of the creditor
interest. Now, however, they.are shut out from this power, and
must see their own creditor citizens returning from Iowa, per-
haps, with a petty dividend from the estate of a bankrupt there,
who remains in the comfortable enjoyment of his country farm,
with his library and pictures about him, a flock of fifty sheep in
his pasture, a ful barn-yard, with provender and. fuel enough for
six months' use, and three months' salary, if he had earned any,
to put at interes, while the assignee of that same Iowa bankrupt
may perhaps be wringmg from some Pennsylvania debtor pro-
perty identical i character with that which his assignor retains
under the laws-L-thus adopted by Congress-of his own state.
Nor can the citizens of any state, admitted- into the Union since
1864, nor of any territory, derive advantage from this exemption.
This limitation. then, in reference to the state laws of 1864
increases instead of diminishing the inequality which seems, how-
ever, inherent in the measure. Every article exempted subtracts,
of course, from the fund out of which the creditors are to be paid.
Let us suppose that two men go into bankruptcy each owning a
house worth $3000 and other property amounting to 1150.0, and-
each owing debts amounting. to $8000 ; one of these men, living
in St. Louis and one in Philadelphia. Each, is allowed under the
general provisions of the act, in furniture.and other necessaries,
$500, and in wearing apparel, &c., ,300nore: the expenscs of
settling each estate, also, are $200. Examine the resultt
The Philadelphia bankrupt has assets'worth40.
Deduct exemptions allowed as above . '$500
400
And expenses of settlement. 9.. 200 1100
Remaining for dividends 1. . .. *3400
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The St. Louis bankrupt has assets-worth $4500
Deduct exemptions allowed as above . . $500
400
Deduct also amount allowed by Missouri law
for his house1  . . .. 8000
And expenses of settlement . 200 4100
Remaining for dividends . . $400
The liabilities being assumed to be $8000, the creditors of the
Pennsylvania bankrupt will receive 42 'per cent. upon their
claims, and the creditors of the Missouri bankrupt will receive
but 5 per cent. !
It is to be observed, also, that these exemptions are regulated
not by the law of the place "in which such debtor has resided or
carried on business for the six months immediately preceding"
thb act of bankruptcy,' but "by the laws of the state in which the
bankrupt has his domicil at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings in bankruptcy."
When Solon, in a time of great "depression" and distress, was
empowered to devise and prbmulgate such laws as he might deem
to be for the good of his country, he indiscreetly told some of his
friends shortly before his laws were publicly announced, that he
had determined to confirm all existing land titles, and to dis-
charge all existing indebtedness. These friends, then, quietly
vent about buying land and borrowing the money with which to
pay for it, so that, when the laws were promulgated, they were
found with large land titles for the laws to confirm, and, large
indebtedness for the laws to discharge. In. much the same way
might an Eastern debtor seek a new home And homestead in the
West, a week or two before bankruptcy became inevitable, and
if it appeared to be a removal with a bond fide intention of making
his future residence there, it might not be easy to determine how
such purchases could be invalidated or attacked by creditors.
It may be argued, in opposition to these viewsithat throughout
our bankruptcy legislation a priority of payment has been always
accorded to debts due from the bankrupt to his state, and that the
constitutionality of this affirmation of state laws has never been
questioned, although its results often produce great inequality of
I James, Bankrupt Law, p. 62.
